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Wednesday
Jul072010

After The Fall

Justin Masterson talks to Tim Tschida during Tuesday night's fan-induced delay.Sixteen minutes.

Sixteen minutes from the time Nelson Cruz’s foul ball evaded the grasp of an off-balance fan in the second deck of Rangers Ballpark in Arlington, until the next pitch of the ballgame was thrown.

It was as surreal as it was spine-chilling. One moment, we were watching a normal ballgame. Normal Cruz at the plate; normal umpire Chris Guccione behind him. Normal Cleveland fielders; normal dugouts; normal crowd.

Normal foul ball.

And then, of course, it happened: a fan trying to catch Cruz’s foul ball plummeted thirty feet into the seats below. Cruz, Guccione, the players on the field and in the dugouts, and the fans throughout the ballpark reacted with horror. It was hard to watch (and listen to the commentary from Josh Lewin, Tom Grieve, Eric Nadel, and Dave Barnett) and not imagine that the fan had fallen to his death.

While emergency medical technicians treated the fan and Indians players kneeled in prayer at their positions, first-base umpire and crew chief Tim Tschida consulted with his colleagues (Guccione, Tim Timmons, and Bob Davidson) as well as Ron Washington, Indians manager Manny Acta, Nolan Ryan, and other officials from the Texas organization. As their discussions ended, Ballpark announcer Chuck Morgan informed fans that the game would resume.

And so after what had to be 16 of the longest minutes ever experienced by fans watching a baseball game, Cruz stepped back into the batter’s box, and Justin Masterson retook the mound.

All things considered – and almost unbelievably – the story had a happy ending. Within an hour, the Rangers had announced that the fan was not only stable and responsive at Fort Worth’s John Peter Smith Hospital, but was also able to move all of his extremities. Four other fans hurt in the fall received treatment at the Ballpark for what were presumably minor injuries.

Well before that announcement, however, and even before Morgan’s confirmation that the game would continue, fans on online forums (and, surely, in homes and bars and at the Ballpark itself) were asking themselves whether the show really had to go on. And hours after the game’s conclusion, that question lingered: should the umpires, in consultation with the Rangers and Indians, have called the game?

My first reaction – the visceral one, the one driven primarily by disbelief and dread – was that play should’ve been stopped for the night, with the ramifications to be sorted out when a man’s life was not (presumably) hanging in the balance.*

* I’m not altogether clear what would’ve happened if the game had been called. MLB Rules 4.10 and 4.12 indicate that, since the fall took place with the Rangers up 3-1 in the bottom of the fifth, it would have resulted in a Rangers win. It seems possible, though, that the exigencies of the situation and the spirit of fairness would’ve justified a decision to resume of the game at a later date.

My second thought was that I didn’t envy the umpires or teams making that decision. As Rangers television broadcaster Josh Lewin noted during the deliberations, there are no official guidelines covering this sort of situation, and certainly no formal training or preparation that could make dealing with it in real time anything besides gut-wrenching.

The more I’ve considered it, the more convinced I am that league and club officials made the right call. Continuing play was very probably the best way to mitigate the impact for everyone involved. If nothing else, it helped take people’s minds off of the horrific scene many had witnessed. It provided crowd and players alike a chance to reestablish some semblance of normality in the midst of what by all indications appeared to be an unfolding tragedy. It permitted some, at least, to use the game as a way to cheer (and perhaps even play) for the injured fan – to channel the rest of the contest into wishes for his well-being.

Continuing the game also helped prevent every iota of media attention from being focused on the story of the fan and his fall for the next 24 hours. The fall was (and is) still a story, of course. Within minutes, every local media outlet had a blurb up about the incident; ESPN.com put a link to the story on its home page. Justifiably so. But with the game continuing, the fall was no longer the story. It wouldn’t be the only thing Rangers and Indians (and other teams’) fans would talk about until the first pitch was thrown this evening. However diminished in importance, the game’s implications for divisional races and individual lines remained. As a result, the fan (and his family and friends) would, in a perfect world, be spared at least a few lumen of the media spotlight.

I could be wrong about all of this. Perhaps the fan’s friends and family would’ve preferred the game had been called, out of respect for his circumstances. Perhaps that’s true of the fan himself. Maybe it was callous to ask players and coaches and umpires to continue to do their jobs, having seen what they saw. Maybe fans shouldn’t have been asked to care about a baseball game after witnessing that sort of event. I don’t think there are any easy answers to dilemmas like these.

What I do know is that if there’s any game that could accomplish what’s been suggested above, it’s baseball. Whether or not it’s been the one constant through all the years, I have to believe that every fan worthy of that term’s origins would agree that the rhythm of the pastime – through plate appearance and inning and game and season – is what draws and keeps them in. For a few hours each day, for a couple hundred days each year, that rhythm sets the tempo of fans’ lives.

Pitch by pitch, run by run, out by out, inning by inning, the decision to resume the rhythm last night – even in the face of tragedy – helped put those 16 minutes behind us. Until, finally, the good news could arrive.

Monday
Jul052010

A Tale Of Two C. Lees: Necessity, Sufficiency And Deadline Dilemmas

Cliff Lee pitches at Rangers Ballpark in Arlington on Monday, June 7th.There's a common thread running through all the analyses of the Bengie Molina trade -- a shared question at their heart: Was it necessary? Did the Rangers need to bring in another catcher? And there's a question that's been asked less frequently, but that's no less important: Was it sufficient? Have the Rangers done enough by bringing in Molina, or is there yet more to be done?

There's no need to add to the many lines written in response to the first question. The answer to the second question, though -- that's worth another word or two. Here's one: No.

The Molina trade was not sufficient to bolster Texas' postseason hopes, because it did nothing to resolve the major pitching issue confronting the Rangers as the July 31 trade deadline approaches -- namely, the doubts about the durability and reliability of their starters, especially in light of their tough second-half schedule.

For all the hopes about the Rangers' rotation this year, at the halfway point of the season, they have only one starter among the top 20 xFIP qualifiers in the American League: Colby Lewis, whose 4.01 puts him at 18th. To find another Ranger on that list, you have to travel more than 20 spots further down the list. C.J. Wilson is 39th, with a 4.64 xFIP; Scott Feldman's 4.71 xFIP places him 42nd. Since the list of qualified AL starters is only 53 players long, that means the Rangers don't have a starter in the top 25 percent of the league in xFIP -- and their remaining two qualified starters are basically in the bottom quarter.

What about the unqualified starters? Tommy Hunter's at 4.64, even after Saturday night's game against the White Sox. The injured Derek Holland's xFIP is at 4.57; his partner on the disabled list, Rich Harden, boasts a 5.74 mark. Current RedHawk Matt Harrison was at 4.87 before his demotion.

Overall, as of Sunday morning, only the Baltimore Orioles' starters had featured a worse xFIP than the Rangers in the Junior Circuit. (By contrast, the Texas bullpen was fourth in xFIP in the AL.)

Now, that ranking doesn't mean the Rangers are doomed to have the second-worst starting pitching in the league in the second half of the season. After all, they've defied the defense-independent stats so far; their starters' cumulative 4.27 ERA puts them in the middle of the AL pack. It's possible they could keep that sort of performance up in the next 81 games, especially given the defense backing them. It's also possible the bullpen could continue saving the starters' rears.

But both Wilson and Lewis have question marks in terms of durability. Feldman, Holland, and Hunter have questions in terms of reliability. Harden has questions in pretty much every facet of pitching known to man. And the Rangers' bullpen has logged more innings than any other team in the AL.

Put bluntly: the Rangers' second-half pitching outlook is a serious concern. Bengie Molina, superior as his game-calling and staff-handling might be, doesn't change that.

So, given their larger pitching issues, why would the Rangers sell Michael Main to the Giants for the difference in salaries between Molina and Chris Ray? It's possible that the Rangers are simply so strapped for cash that they couldn't take on any additional salary whatsoever for the rest of the season -- but saw Molina as sufficient to address their battery woes. That would be a mistake, given the fragile state of the starters.

It would also tend to contradict Jon Daniels' public indications that the Rangers have enough financial flexibility to allow them to make a move in July. Granted, that flexibility could have been maintained if the Rangers simply hadn't made the Molina trade -- but assuming that Texas viewed the acquisition of a backstop as necessary (but not sufficient) step, then the action to make the deal with the Giants dollar-neutral could well speak to the Rangers front office having future pitching moves in mind.

Cliff Lee looms large. His 3.31 xFIP is not only second in the AL; it's the fifth-best among all qualified major-league starters, period. Lee's early-season injury may actually be a boon should the Rangers acquire him, since despite averaging nearly 8 innings per start, he's only racked up 95.2 IP, and has thrown just 1,313 pitches. He's not just a TORP guy; he's a true ace. And half of a season of Lee comes cheap, at approximately $4.5 million.

The question, of course, is whether Lee's value would justify the price the Rangers would have to pay to acquire him. For the moment, let's assume the Mariners would be willing to trade Lee within the division. (That seems fair, since Seattle is out of the post-season chase -- and as a free agent unlikely to sign with an AL West team, Lee wouldn't come back to haunt the Mariners in future seasons.) What you have left is the apparent dilemma at the core of all the rumors and speculations regarding the Rangers' potential pursuit of a trade for Lee (or, really, for any other top-of-the-rotation pitcher, such as Roy Oswalt or Dan Haren).

The dilemma: whether to trade the uncertain futures yet indubitable talents of top prospects for the dependable performance yet uncertain impact of a top (or even ace) starter. But does trading for Cliff Lee necessarily entail a present-for-future tradeoff? And would it be sufficient to put the Rangers over the top?

Consider those questions through the lens of the last Rangers' deal for a C. Lee: Carlos, in late July of 2006. Texas traded then-closer (and 2007 free agent) Francisco Cordero, corner outfielder Kevin Mench, Triple-A outfielder Laynce Nix, and Single-A reliever Julian Cordero to the Brewers for Lee and Triple-A outfielder Nelson Cruz. The idea was that the free-agent-to-be Lee would take the Rangers to the promised land of the playoffs for the first time since 1999; Texas also hoped to re-sign Lee to a long-term deal.

Lee put up a .322/.369/.525 line (.383 wOBA) for Texas, while playing atrocious defense in left. Over the first 103 games of the season, the Rangers averaged 4.95 runs per game, and gave up 4.89; in the 59 games with Lee, the Rangers scored 5.51 runs a game, and gave up 4.75 on average. Sadly, the improvement wasn't enough. When Lee joined the team, it had a 51-52 record – 2.5 games back of the division-leading Angels, and half a game behind the second-place A's. From that point on, Texas never managed to climb more than 3 games above .500, or any closer than 3 games back. And for that reason, many Rangers fans considered the Lee trade a failure.

Texas' expressed hopes of signing Lee after the season also flopped. Rather than re-up with the Rangers, Lee inked a six-year, $100 million deal with the Houston Astros. In the first three years of that contract, he's posted wOBAs of .370, .396, and .355 -- but he is struggling mightily this year, and continues to be a serious defensive liability.

Meanwhile, Francisco Cordero has had mixed results with the Reds, having signed a four-year, $46 million deal plus club option after 2006. Kevin Mench disappointed with the Brewers in 2006 and 2007, was only marginally better in a year with the Blue Jays in 2008, played 15 games for Japan's Hanshin Tigers in 2009, and is currently at Triple-A Syracuse, in the Washington Nationals' system. Laynce Nix played only 20 major league ballgames with the Brewers before following Cordero to Cincinnati in 2008, where he's continued to struggle at the plate. And Julian Cordero completely fell off the map after 2006.

Four years on, then, Nelson Cruz is probably the most important player included in the deal, at least for the Rangers and the Brewers. And yet Cruz was an afterthought for many, if not most, fans of both teams -- another example of Jon Daniels pulling off a Steve-Jobsian “one more thing.” Neftali Feliz, Engel Beltre, Nelson Cruz: all were generally viewed as high-ceiling, high-variance throw-ins at the time their deals were made.

Additionally, because Lee was a Type-A free agent after 2006, the Rangers recouped the Astros' first-round pick (the 17th overall) and a "sandwich pick" in the June 2007 draft. Those picks turned into Blake Beavan and Julio Borbon, respectively. (The Rangers gave up their own first-round pick, 16th overall, to the Blue Jays, for signing Frank Catalanotto; with the 24th pick overall -- compensation for Gary Matthews, Jr. signing with the Angels -- Texas took Michael Main.)

So did the Rangers sacrifice the future for the present in the Carlos Lee trade? Not really. Was improving their offense a necessity to make the postseason? Very probably. But was the Lee deal sufficient? No: because the Rangers drastically overestimated their playoff chances in 2006. Even had the Rangers played to their “Pythagorean” expectation after the Lee acquisition, they would've had a record of 34-25 -- good only for an 85-77 finish. And Texas also misjudged its chances at keeping Lee.

The Carlos Lee trade is a study in the difference between necessity and sufficiency. In this case, the gap was only bridged by how the Rangers hedged their present-versus-future bets. The return on the Lee deal was sufficient to render it a success, despite the Rangers' failure to achieve their more immediate objectives in 2006.

The Rangers' course in the second half of 2010 depends on Daniels successfully navigating the tricky course between necessity and sufficiency. If the Rangers fail to make a move for a front-line pitcher, then Daniels will again open himself to charges that he struggles at bringing in major-league talent at critical junctures, and at properly weighing prospects' prospective promise against promising playoff prospects. This has been the biggest knock on Daniels' GM tenure to date (see: Adam Eaton, Brandon McCarthy, Frank Catalanotto, et al). Even given the club's financial and legal situation, now that Daniels has pulled the trigger on the Molina deal, a failure to follow it with a trade that bolsters the rotation could -- and, to some degree, should -- raise questions about his ability to put the Rangers in the best position to seriously contend for a World Series crown.

Daniels needs to work his magic once more, and this time under the pressure of a legitimate pennant chase. He needs to acquire a Game One starter, while not sacrificing too many key components of the Rangers' postseason hopes for the next several years. And if the Molina deal did not, in fact, preserve Texas' financial flexibility – to the point that the club might be able to pick up the remainder of Lee's 2010 salary, rather than sending added prospects to Seattle – then Daniels has made his own job harder still.

Cliff Lee isn't Carlos Lee. A high-powered package structured around Martin Perez (or Tanner Scheppers, or Derek Holland) isn't equivalent to a deal highlighted by two months of Francisco Cordero. But Cliff Lee is all but a lock to be a Type-A free agent after 2010 -- and the Rangers are even less likely to keep him than they were Carlos. (As Jamey Newberg pointed out in an e-mail Sunday afternoon, however, it's possible he might only be worth the second-round pick of his signing team in 2011, especially if that team is the Yankees.) The parallels to 2006 aren't exact, but they are there. Maybe -- just maybe -- Daniels can give the Rangers "one more thing": pulling another promising prospect (Maikel Cleto?) out of the Mariners' hats along with Lee, and balancing the "now" and "then" sides of Texas' talent equation.

As in the past, if Daniels does succeed at cutting the Gordian knot binding the Rangers' present and future, it will be because he gambled on both. And if he fails, then the inevitable questions surrounding his position under new ownership will gain force.

[Note: All stats courtesy of FanGraphs and Baseball Reference.]

Sunday
Jul042010

Sunday Morning Open Thread: Five Questions

Tommy Hunter delivers a first-inning pitch against the White Sox on Saturday, July 3rd.1. What's your final abridged assessment of the Bengie Molina trade? For that matter, am I completely undervaluing the worth of leadership/game-calling/etc. in the context of this trade?

2. A question that could, I suppose, be framed as "just how legitimate is Tommy Hunter?": If the playoffs started tomorrow, would you rather roll with Hunter or Scott Feldman as your No. 3 playoff starter behind Colby Lewis and C.J. Wilson?

3. Have Jarrod Saltalamacchia and/or Taylor Teagarden already seen their last and best chances to establish themselves in the Rangers' organization come and go?

4. Which secondary trade candidates -- that is, guys who aren't quite as buzz-inducing as Cliff Lee or Roy Oswalt, but could still generate value in an abbreviated time frame -- have you found yourself tracking, or would like to see Texas make a run at?

5. We've finally hit the bottom of the question barrel, so here is where you can exercise your option to pose your own question and perhaps see it used next week. The creator of the best question wins a copy of Nickelback's latest album signed by Danny Balis and the first-season DVD of Rich Phillips' "Raceweek" -- or something.

Saturday
Jul032010

The Final Word On Bengie Molina

About 36 hours and one highly forgettable game -- which I'll refrain from commenting on, although thinking back, it's odd that the Rangers effectively played for one run in the bottom of the third inning with a no-out sacrifice bunt, but didn't play for one run in the top half of the inning by keeping the infield pulled back with a runner on third base and one out -- have elapsed since the trade, and after having had some time to ponder it, to analyze it, to digest it, I've unceremoniously concluded that I'm still not a fan of it. I understand why it was done, but that doesn't mean I like it. I doubt very many of those residing in the prospect-educated camp do like it.

ESPN.com's Jayson Stark stated yesterday that he was a fan of the Bengie Molina-to-Texas deal, even going so far as to suggest that San Francisco would come to regret it because Molina "is a winner." With all due respect to Stark, that, in a nutshell, symbolizes the source of some of the backlash we've seen against this deal: In a baseball context, what does it really mean to be "a winner?" Moreover, what value does such a nebulous attribute bring to the table? I think "veteran leadership" -- another popular baseball buzzword closely associated with Molina -- does give you something, particularly on a relatively young ballclub that lost its de facto leader to free agency (Marlon Byrd), but people notice the underwhelming statistics, find themselves overwhelmed by vague baseball-ingrained descriptors and naturally become suspicious. It's not surprising.

With Molina's projected rest-of-2010 offense being roughly equivalent to what we would expect from either Matt Treanor or Max Ramirez (and, for that matter, inferior baserunning), strong defensive/leadership qualities are a necessity rather than a luxury; absent those, the Rangers would have likely done just as well plucking a replacement-level backstop out of somewhere. With no good way to quantify the value of leadership, but while still acknowledging its presence, we turn to Molina's defensive chops -- something which has eroded, per various anecdotal reports, because old, bad-body catchers don't typically hold up well in that regard. 

When I say "defensive chops," I'm referring more to the physical aspects of the position that immediately spring to mind -- throwing out baserunners (and not committing errors while doing so) and preventing passed balls/wild pitches. He's presumably still stronger in that regard than Max Ramirez, whose defense behind the plate has been described by Jason Parks as "fringe-average," but arguably not as strong as Matt Treanor; in other words, it's an upgrade, but one of the marginal variety. Of course, Molina's forte -- and the apparent driving force behind this deal -- is his game-calling ability, something which is separate and distinct from those aforementioned aspects of the catching position.

Not even the world's top sabermetricians really understand how to quantify perhaps the haziest component of catcher defense, which leaves only the conviction of baseball people in its value. I'm inclined to play things safe and neither dismiss the value of game-calling nor go overboard in extolling its virtues, but let's say for the sake of argument that the difference between a really great game-caller and a below-average one is around two full wins per season (that might be overstating the case). With Molina likely slated for 50-60 percent of the playing time going forward, that's around one-.half of one win added above and beyond Max Ramirez, or several million dollars of value.

In a pennant race, one-half of one win can help make a difference, but here's a converse point of view -- pitch framing (or the catcher doing whatever necessary to help generate more strike calls) may not be a part of the total game-calling package, but is something that is given a fair amount of attention in the context of catcher defense. Matthew Carruth of Lookout Landing/FanGraphs examined the value of pitch framing back in February, compared a perceived pitch-framing leader (Kenji Johjima) to a purported weakling (Rob Johnson), and found that the difference over a full season amounted to a whopping two runs. That's it. Two runs. We can't pretend to understand everything (anything?) about the catching dynamic, but count me among those inclined to play it conservative when it comes to internally valuing it.

Look, we get why this deal was made. The Rangers felt they needed to find catching reinforcements sooner rather than later, and ponied up for the reliable what-you-see-is-what-you-get veteran type. It was never my intention to paint Michael Main as some sort of untouchable super-prospect, because he's not; rather, he was a good medium-upside pitching prospect that was expendable in the right deal. The thing about it is, I still dislike what it represents, because Texas still overpaid for what was likely a very marginal overall upgrade -- and not in money, but talent. Were that to become a longer-running trend, the strength that is the Rangers' farm system would not be a strength for very long. For now, I'm just going to trust that there won't be any such trend.

Friday
Jul022010

Ben Badler Discusses The 2010 International Free Agent Market 

Martin Perez, arguably baseball's top pitching prospect, was signed by Texas in 2007 for $580,000. - Photo courtesy of Scott LucasJuly 2nd marks the beginning of the international free agent signing period for baseball prospects outside the U.S. and Canada who have turned 16 years of age. More than 25 percent of the players in Major League Baseball this year were signed as international free agents, including 21 of the top 60 hitters and 14 of the top 60 pitchers according to WAR calculations as of June 25th. Eleven players who have donned a Rangers jersey this season began their professional careers after signing as international free agents: Elvis Andrus, Neftali Feliz, Alexi Ogando, Nelson Cruz, Vlad Guerrero, Frankie Francisco, Max Ramirez, Joaquin Arias, Andres Blanco, Pedro Strop, and Guillermo Moscoso. 

The international market is clearly an important one for teams like that Rangers that are focused on player acquisition and development. In the past few years, the Rangers have signed Martin Perez, Jurickson Profar, Wilmer Font, Luis Sardinas, Jorge Alfaro, Edwin Escobar (who begat Ben Snyder), and other international free agents. Although budget constraints make it unlikely that the Rangers will be able to compete with the Yankees, Blue Jays, Mariners, Red Sox, and Athletics in handing out multi-million dollar signing bonuses, the team is expected to sign one or two of the top 25 players from Latin America this year. 

Ben Badler from Baseball America graciously agreed to answer a few questions about the 2010 international free agent market. As the lead for the International Affairs section at Baseball America, Badler writes the scouting reports for international prospects that get discussed, quoted, and plagiarized by baseball fans and writers the world over.  You can follow Ben’s work on the international market at Baseball America and on Twitter.

BBTiA: Like the 2010 MLB draft, this year's international free agent market seems to have been more difficult to project than previous years. What are the factors that have contributed to how hard it has been to rank and place the prospects in the 2010 class?

Ben Badler: You're right, it is more difficult to project than most years, and I think there are a few reasons why. One is that the bonus money has gotten so big so fast. All of a sudden there have been marginal players receiving mid six-figure bonuses or even upwards of $1 million. When that happens, now the agent or the trainer of any kid with a plus tool (or who thinks his player has a plus tool) seems to be asking for $1 million like it's nothing. That makes a lot of scouts throw their hands up in the air in frustration, but at the same time, while those players usually have to wait until well after July 2nd for their prices to come down to be able to sign, every now and then a team goes nuts and is willing to give a huge bonus to a player who a lot of scouts don't view as that caliber of player, so it's hard to knock the strategy if it works every now and then.

The other huge factor is that Major League Baseball has required 40 of the top Dominican prospects to pre-register with MLB, which includes the players consenting to a drug test and to an investigation of their age and identity. That process has slowed down the market, with reports this week of nearly half of those 40 players failing their drug tests and MLB still not having completed all of their age and identity investigations.

BBTiA: 2010 has been described as a relatively weak year for international free agents, while 2011 is apparently stacking up to be a very strong year. Would you agree with this assessment?

Badler: It is a down year for talent, and that's probably another factor that has made this year's July 2nd market a slow-developing one. When there aren't clearly defined top players, it means there's a lot more variance of opinion in who the top players should be, which I believe makes things take longer to unravel in terms of setting the market. Next year's class is a very strong year that people are already excited about. That said, even the best scouts in the business who have been doing this for more than 10 or 20 years will tell you that a class that looks great now might not turn out to be so great 15 years down the road, and vice versa -- that's just the nature of scouting 15- and 16-year-old kids in Latin America.

BBTiA: You mentioned Esteilon Peguero as a possible target for the Rangers. Can you provide a quick review of his strengths and weaknesses and discuss the likelihood that he will sign with the Rangers?

Badler: Right now, as of June 30th, I'd say the Rangers are probably one of the frontrunners to sign Peguero. He's certainly a player of high interest for a lot of clubs, it's just a question of whether those clubs are willing to pay for him because he might be the best bat in the Dominican Republic if not all of Latin America. He's shown he can hit in games, and while the swing isn't perfect, it's very good for a 16-year-old and he's shown he can hit in games against live pitching, which for me is the most important thing to look for. He's not a huge power hitter but he can drive the ball into the gaps and should grow into more power. Speed and defense aren't a big part of his game, but he should be able to slot in at either second or third base and handle the position.

BBTiA: Are you aware of any other players whom the Rangers appear likely to sign in July?

Badler: Like I said before, it's a difficult market to forecast. My understanding is that Peguero is their top target, but I'm sure there are other mid-range or possibly other top-level players who they will be after regardless of whether they sign him.

BBTiA: Do you have any favorite sleepers (i.e., players who are unlikely to get one of the top 10 bonuses but will nonetheless develop into top 100 prospects)?

Badler: There are players who I'm projecting to get top 10 bonuses who I've gotten very promising reviews on; Peguero, RHP Luis Heredia (Mexico), 3B Renato Nunez (Venezuela), OF Phillips Castillo (Dominican Republic) and SS Rougned Odor (Venezuela) all sound like potential top 100 guys down the road. Looking a bit deeper down the list, there is a left-hander from Venezuela named Jose Tovar who sounds like he has an impressive combination of stuff across the board and feel for pitching. There's another Venezuelan, shortstop Ronny Mejias, who will probably move off the position but has an excellent swing, and a third baseman in Venezuela named Jordis Calderon who's a good athlete who can hit some and has plus power. The most important thing for me is whether a guy can hit, and it sounds like all the hitters I mentioned above have a good chance to hit.

BBTiA: Most of the 2009 class of 16-year-old international free agents have had an opportunity to work in fall instructional leagues and appear in professional leagues. Who are the standouts in last year’s class?

Badler: Miguel Sano with the Twins is 17 and he's already probably the best hitter in the Dominican Summer League, and the Yankees Gary Sanchez is having a monster week in the Gulf Coast League. Shortstop Jose Vinicio (Red Sox) and OF Guillermo Pimentel (Mariners) are also good-looking hitters who got paid and are looking good early on in the complex leagues. I will say the reports I've received on Jurickson Profar since he signed have been better than before he signed, which probably has a lot to do with him coming from Curacao, where there are just fewer scouts, and because a lot of teams stopped scouting him early on because he was so strongly linked to the Rangers. A lot of teams liked him better as a pitcher than as a shortstop, but the Rangers are sold on him as a shortstop and sending him to the Northwest League as a 17-year-old is a pretty big sign of their belief in his ability.

Alfredo Morales, an outfielder with the Mariners is another guy who was a high-profile guy but who might have even flown a bit under the radar because the reports on him from the Arizona League so far have been great. Another Ranger who signed last year worth mentioning is David Perez, a right hander who is off to a terrific start in the DSL. He was a relatively high-profile arm from last year but he's proven to be much more advanced than I thought at this time a year ago. He's definitely one to keep an eye on.

BBTiA: Thank you, Ben, for taking time out of your busy schedule to discuss the 2010 (and 2009 and 2011) J2 market with BBTiA. 

[Ben published an ordered list of the 33 prospects from Latin America whom he believes will receive the highest signing bonuses this year. The list includes links to videos for many of the prospects.]

Thursday
Jul012010

Revisiting The Bengie Molina Trade

"There is nothing from Major League Baseball that restricts us," said Tom Hicks. "There are no restrictions, as long as we stay within our budget. It's business as usual." Right.

I thought that I had properly conveyed where I fell on yesterday's Bengie Molina-to-Texas trade already this morning, but in that analysis, I made the erroneous assumption that the player to be named later joining Chris Ray would be "a very marginal C- prospect" or somebody of that ilk. In retrospect, that was a dangerous assumption to make of a team with scant financial resources, and one of the risks you run in rendering final opinions with incomplete information in hand, because said player to be named later, according to Baseball America's Jim Callis, is Double-A Frisco right-hander Michael Main.

Said Baseball Time in Arlington's resident prospect analyst, Jason Parks, of Main back on May 5th: "Potential for electric arsenal. Present fastball sits in the 90-91 mph range with a sustainable velocity projection at the plus level (91-93 mph; max 95 mph). Pitch features above-average late life when thrown low in the zone, with sneaky velocity stemming from quick arm action.An eventual move to the bullpen would make sense, especially if the change-up doesn’t reach its developmental peak; in short bursts, Main could run his fastball into the mid-90s and use his curveball to miss bats. Tool-based grade: 56; solid-average No. 3 starter/front-line set-up man at the major league level."

That Texas elected to pull the trigger on such a deal -- a deal which prompted Callis to invoke a comparison to 2008's Carlos Santana-for-Casey Blake heist by the Indians -- tells us several things, the most significant of which is the Rangers' seeming certainty that neither Jarrod Saltalamacchia nor Taylor Teagarden are remotely on the cusp of returning to the majors; it wouldn't be far-fetched in the slightest to assert that both have fallen off the organizational road map. Despite the negligible difference between what Molina was projected to supply offensively for Texas and what the Max Ramirez/Matt Treanor tandem was projected to do (all three were projected to perform at a .295-.305 wOBA level the remainder of the season), there's clearly something that led the Rangers to believe that the status quo wouldn't have been tenable for much longer.

But with Molina not amounting to any sort of upgrade offensively, you're paying a significant premium for his veterancy and purportedly strong game-calling ability -- the true value of which I believe is very nebulous and virtually impossible to ascertain -- and leaning on that as your justification for giving up young talent. I despise that line of thought. Molina is not worth Michael Main alone. Looking at it another way, though, Main is the cost of accepting a $2 million subsidy to cover Molina's rest-of-2010 salary, which I think tells you several things: (a) you should not swing a trade if you cannot cover the remaining balance without requiring salary relief, and (b) the Rangers want to maintain whatever pittance of available money they have to pursue further trades.

Part (b) perhaps suggests that we cannot view this trade in isolation without seeing what other pre-July 31st trades get accomplished, but in the here and now, looking at this trade as it stands and this organization as presently constructed, this trade is very disappointing, and something which likely serves as ammunition for the camp which remains highly skeptical as far as whether Jon Daniels is really the general manager to put the finishing touches on a contending ballclub in the June-to-July trade window.

Thursday
Jul012010

Highest Ceilings In The Rangers System: Wilmer Font (#6)

Wilmer Font - Photo courtesy of Scott LucasThe following series will count down the 25 highest ceilings (based on AOFP grades) in the Rangers' minor league system. I have scouted every player on the list in person and compiled the grades using those observations, conversations with respected voices in the Rangers' community like Lone Star Dugout's Jason Cole, and conversations with numerous scouts. Being a subjective exercise, opinions will vary on the individual tool grades, and ultimately, on the final tool projections.

Before we discuss the scouting scale and my methods of evaluation, it's important to note that the AOFP-based rankings below differ from the prospect rankings you may be more accustomed to seeing. The grades here are based on raw tools, and aren't intended to capture each player's most realistic ceiling. Age, league, and other contextual factors are generally excluded, although younger players have more room for development and therefore can receive the benefit of such an abstract view.

It should also be noted that this series was designed to highlight players currently playing in the Rangers' minor league system. For example: a player like Neftali Feliz, whose composite grades would rank him in the top tier of prospects in the system, will be excluded from this list because he is currently on the 25-man roster and not likely to spend any time on the farm.

The Scouting Scale/Methods:

For each tool (hitter) or individual offering (pitcher), a scout assigns the player a grade on a numerical scale that runs from 20 to 80 in five-point increments. 50 is major-league average, and 80 represents the top available score. The sides of the tool bell curve are extremely steep, and there's not much space beneath the curve's tails. In other words, there are very, very few players with 80-caliber tools, and lots of prospects whose tools score a 50. Because of this, scouts may also assign qualitative descriptors (e.g., "fringe-average," "solid-average") to modify scores of 50 that don't quite warrant a bump down to 45 or up to 55.

The scout averages the tool grades to produce an "Overall Future Potential" (OFP) grade. (As a result, OFP also has a 20-to-80 range, but isn't limited to scores ending in "5" or "0.") After OFP is calculated, a scout can adjust it based on his observation, experience, and intuition. This results in an AOFP: the "A" stands for "adjusted." An AOFP above 60 is generally indicative of an elite prospect: a guy with the potential to star in a championship-caliber lineup, rotation, or bullpen.

An AOFP of 55-59 typically implies a prospect that will be a first-division starter, including a solid No. 2 or No. 3 starter, front-line reliever, or second-tier closer. AOFPs in the 50-54 range suggest a solid-average major leaguer, including back-of-the-rotation starters and some late-inning arms who fall just below having "front-line" status. Players with AOFPs lower than 50 are usually fringe-average players like utility infielders, fourth/fifth outfielders, and middle relievers. Not a single player on this list will have an AOFP below 54.

The Players:

Name: Wilmer Font
DOB: 05/24/1990
Birthplace: La Guiria, Venezuela
HT/WT: 6' 4", 230 lb.
Bats/Throws: R/R

Arm Action: Fluid and fast.

Delivery/Mechanical characteristics: Some mechanical inconsistencies; stride length will vary; some balance issues/awkwardness; low three-quarters delivery (often slots in standard three-quarters).

Physical Description: Big projectable frame, with broad shoulders and long limbs; strong, but doesn’t seem overly athletic and body doesn’t possess lean muscle. Body has potential to hold extra weight, which could present a problem after physical maturity is achieved.

Abilities: Easy FB velocity, with ability to sit comfortably in the 92-95 mph range; can touch the upper-90s (even hit triple digits) in short bursts; the ability to flash 80-grade velocity makes Font an attractive option out of the bullpen, should the development of a starter’s arsenal not take place. Arm action is quick and fluid, allowing FB to sneak up on hitters and play up beyond already impressive raw velocity. Uses FB as main weapon; when command is on, can spot pitch low in the zone with some natural weight and run to the arm-side. Control is currently more advanced than command, which limits the overall effectiveness of the pitch. Despite lower arm slot, uses height and angle to create good downhill plane to FB.

CU is promising, with good velocity separation from FB and some tumble and fading movement away from LHP. Thanks to consistent arm speed, and a late hand-break, Font is able to use deception to his advantage, which makes his CU a future plus pitch and a nice complement to his FB. While his CB often looks more like a slow-slurve, the pitch does flash above-average at times, and has the potential to develop into an average major league offering. When he can stay on top of the pitch, the CB will feature a two-plane break, with some depth. At this point of his development, showing the ability to flash a good breaker, regardless of the consistency of the present pitch, is promising.  Font has a durable, projectable frame, that allows him to hold velocity deep into games and chew innings. Displays good work ethic and maturity, and overall feel for pitching has improved dramatically over the past year.

Weaknesses: Despite impressive raw FB velocity, Font’s overall FB grade is pulled down by below-average present command, and only average command projection. Release point inconsistencies will push the FB up in the zone, offering hitters a single-plane view and better contact rates. Font can get too FB dependent at times, removing sequence and deception from the arsenal and allowing hitters too much comfort in their approach. Lacks plus breaking ball; curve will flash plus at times, but often breaks too early out of hand and looks more like a slow slurve that can be recognized early. When Font can’t stay on top of the pitch, it isn’t much of a weapon against RH, limiting the range of his overall repertoire. It’s been stated before that Font’s arm slot and arm action are more conducive for a slider, and I have to agree with this assessment. It’s not necessary to strip the curve from the arsenal at this time. However, I think a hard slider would be a natural fit, and a pitch that would play very well with his fastball.

His CU is promising, but still inconsistent, thanks to release point variations. Despite having a projectable, workhorse frame, Font’s body is a current weakness; he lacks elite athleticism and will need to monitor extra weight as he continues to physically mature. Font can look awkward at times, especially when attempting to field his position, but given his present body/maturity, its not surprising that Font experiences some coordination issues. While slowly evolving from a thrower into a pitcher, at the present, Font can still look very raw and underdeveloped, especially when it comes to pitch sequence and situation. Needs to hold runners better and improve time to plate; clocked in the 1.6- to 1.8-second range on numerous occasions thanks to a high/delayed leg lift.

Conclusion: Raised OFP grade two points based on potential of fastball (raw velocity grade could be 80 out of bullpen) and advanced feel for change-up. Font possesses a rare fastball, that has been clocked as high as 100 mph, and will routinely sit in the 92-96 range as a starter. His CU, a pitch with plus projection, is a nice compliment to his present FB and features above-average tumble and fade. His breaking ball is currently below average, but will flash promise, although it remains to be seen if the pitch can become a consistent offering, or if a slider would be a better fit for his arm action/slot.

His current command is below average and lacks above-average projection, but he does have some feel for control and should eventually become an average strike-thrower. His overall approach still needs refinement, but the maturation process from thrower to pitcher is evident and encouraging. His present body leaves him a bit awkwardly coordinated, and he will need to stay focused on his overall conditioning as he continues to physically mature. Tool-based grade: 58; solid-average No. 2 starter at the major league level or frontline set-up man/second tier closer. 

[Check out the entire collection of scouting reports here. Special thanks to Deric McKamey, Josh Garoon, and Joey Matschulat. Follow me on Twitter @ProfessorParks.]

Wednesday
Jun302010

Wednesday Morning Rangers Notes: When It All Falls Down

Darren Oliver tries to figure out where things went so horribly wrong on Tuesday, June 29th.Here's something to consider in the context of last night's top of the seventh inning, when Ian Kinsler tried -- and failed miserably -- to notch a one-out bunt single with Michael Young occupying first base in a 6-3 game: Not only is the major league bunt hit success rate in man-on-first-and-one-out situations stunningly low (a meager 29.8 percent, from 1970-2006), but Kinsler, whose on-base percentage (.387) ranks second among all qualifying major league second basemen, has a lifetime bunt hit success rate of 32.7 percent, a mark which hardly justifies the forgone power and on-base value.

I understand that there's something to be gained from keeping the opposing defense honest with the "element of surprise" and what not, but (a) the historical data suggests that was an inherently poor game situation for Kinsler to attempt to pull off such a gambit, (b) attempting to bunt for a hit eliminates any prospect of an extra-base hit, which significantly deflates whatever offensive expectations you might have had of Kinsler in that plate appearance, and (c) Kinsler's not that good at bunting for hits anyway. Ron Washington assuredly didn't call for that, but it's time for the manager -- or the bench coach, or somebody -- to figure out a way to curtail such poor in-game tactical decisions by the players:

● 28-year-old Omar Beltre will make his major league debut tonight in Anaheim; Texas has not yet announced the corresponding roster move necessary to clear room for Beltre's placement on the active roster (Richard Durrett, ESPN.com)

[Well, it's a better idea than throwing Matt Harrison or Dustin Nippert at the Angels and watching everything go up in flames. Scout.com's Jason Cole recently observed Beltre sitting at 93-94 mph -- topping out at 96 mph -- at Triple-A Oklahoma City, boasting strong bottom-half command with a heater which he complements with a mid-80s splitter and low-80s slider. Repertoire-wise, this seems somewhat comparable to the arsenal wielded by the Mets' Mike Pelfrey, but such analysis is simplistic, and Pelfrey isn't a swing-and-miss guy in the vein of Beltre. Harrison is probably the odds-on favorite to get optioned to the minors, although Chris Ray still has some dark-horse candidacy in that regard.]

● The acquisition cost for Cliff Lee "should be lower than the last two times he was traded"; however, one front-office official from an unnamed American League team stated Monday night that trading for Lee would require the Mets to part with "three of [their] best prospects" (Ken Rosenthal, FOXSports.com; Matt Pignataro, NYBaseballDigest.com)

[Rosenthal suggests that an offer on the Yankees' end comprising baseball's top "catching" prospect, Jesus Montero (he's likely destined for 1B/DH work), and a "solid pitching prospect" could seal the deal for Lee; interesting timing on that, as ESPN.com's Keith Law dropped his updated top 25 prospects list yesterday and pegged Montero as the No. 6 prospect in baseball ... and Double-A Frisco southpaw Martin Perez at No. 5. The market for Lee hasn't exactly been established beyond a shadow of a doubt, and thus we're really not sure if the Mariners' expectedly high demands are going to be completely out of line with the market, but I have an extremely difficult time fathoming how Texas could swing a deal without including at least one of Perez/T. Scheppers/D. Holland.]

Tuesday
Jun292010

Rangers Prospect Analysis: Ben Snyder And Zach Phillips

Matt Harrison has joined the Rangers’ bullpen and provided the team with two left-handed relievers for the first time this season. 23-year-old Zach Phillips and 24-year-old Ben Snyder provide the organization with left-handed relief depth that could be tapped this year if the need arises in the major league bullpen. 

After producing stellar numbers in his first go at relieving in 2009, Phillips has been even better this year pitching in AA and AAA (see table below). Phillips combines a fastball, curveball, and change-up to produce groundballs and strikeouts. Phillips’ best pitch is his change-up, which helps explain why he has been almost as effective against right-handed batters as against lefties (see bottom of table). In his two worst statistical seasons (2006 and 2008), Phillips walked more than four batters per nine innings. He has exhibited very good control in his other four seasons (2.7 BB/9). 

Zach Phillips

Like Phillips, Snyder converted to the bullpen in 2009 after spending his first few years in the minors as a starting pitcher. Though Snyder hasn’t been as impressive as Phillips thus far in 2010, the Rangers’ 2009 Rule 5 draft pick and spring training trade acquisition has been solid pitching out of the Frisco bullpen (see table below). Snyder’s best secondary pitch is his slider, which helps explain why he has been so good against left-handed hitters (10.1 K/9, 2.0 BB/9). Snyder is working on his change-up, though he is still struggling against right-handed hitters (4.63 FIP vs. right-handed hitters compared to a 2.40 FIP vs. left-handed hitters in 2010).  

Ben Snyder

David’s Take

There are two types of left-handed relievers -- those whom you don’t think about as being left-handed and those whose value derives primarily from being left-handed. The former class includes the likes of Matt Thornton, Billy Wagner, George Sherrill, Arthur Rhodes, Mike Gonzalez, Jeremy Affeldt, Darren Oliver, and Jose Mijares. Left-handed relievers who can be called upon 50-80 times per year to pitch an inning or more per appearance can be worth 1-2 wins above replacement per season. High quality left-handed relievers typically feature a low- to mid-90s fastball and a plus slider. Exceptions to this rule (Darren Oliver, JP Howell, Hideki Okajima circa 2007 and 2008) typically have a third pitch to complement their upper-80s fastballs and breaking balls. Oliver’s cutter, Howell’s change-up, and Okajima’s split-finger make their fastballs far more effective and provide them with pitches that are effective against right-handed hitters.

Relievers whose value derives primarily from their ability to pitch against left-handed hitters include the likes of Pedro Feliciano, Trever Miller, Scott Eyre, Eric O’Flaherty, Mitch Stetter, Joe Beimel, and Randy Choate. LOOGY’s combine a mid- to upper-80s fastball and an above-average to plus slider. Because they pitch relatively few innings, even the best LOOGY’s in baseball typically produce no more than 0.5 wins above what would be expected of a replacement level reliever. The value of an effective LOOGY derives mostly from allowing a coach to reduce his use of his most effective relievers. Among the Rangers current relief corps, for instance, only Neftali Feliz (3.40) and Frank Francisco (3.55) sport career FIPs vs left-handed hitters that are below 4.00. Faced with a high-leverage situation in the middle innings that require pitching against one or more tough left-handed hitters, the team would benefit from having an effective LOOGY instead of having to call upon one of its late-inning relievers.

Based on his stuff and performance, Snyder’s ceiling appears to be that of a major league LOOGY along the lines of Mitch Stetter or Trever Miller.  Snyder’s opportunity to pitch in the major league bullpen will likely depend upon the team having starters and other relievers who can soak up enough innings to accommodate a reliever who will likely pitch 40 innings per year. 

Zach Phillips’ fastball/curveball/change-up is reminiscent of JP Howell and Hideki Okajima, both of whom have produced multiple 1.0-plus WAR seasons. Continued improvement with his fastball and maintained control could allow Phillips to graduate to “big-league reliever.”

Trip’s Take

David’s take is very fair, but I think it’s a mistake to classify Phillips as a particular type of left-handed reliever. Phillips does not exhibit the L-R splits that indicate a LOOGY-like ceiling, and while his fastball doesn’t light up the radar gun, it sits comfortably in the 89-91 MPH range and is frequently commanded with a starter’s precision.

His change up is arguably his best offering, and it certainly generates its share of swings and misses. At times this season, though, Phillips would go entire outings without throwing it, opting instead to attack right-handed batters with his curveball. It is unclear whether this was Phillips’ choice or it was a developmental hurdle he was asked to jump. That said, he was promoted to AAA Oklahoma City shortly after I took note of it.

I still feel like Phillips has the pitches to succeed as a #4 or #5 starter, but velocity concerns prompted the Rangers to move him to the bullpen where his fastball has crept up to its current level. His arsenal should preclude him from ever being a LOOGY, but that is certainly a reasonable floor for his potential. I feel he is a very solid middle-relief candidate capable of long relief, with the potential to fill a late-inning/setup role.

(Snyder disclaimer: My perspective is slightly warped since I’ve only seen his home games where, as of this writing, he’d given up a whopping 28 of his 34 hits allowed. There’s no doubt that my perspective would be different if the reverse were true.)

Despite his success against both left- and right-handed hitters, Snyder does not profile as well as Phillips because he lacks a polished change-up and has below-average fastball velocity. On the other hand, Snyder has more room for improvement than Phillips.

Snyder’s velocity definitely fits into the “soft-tossing lefty” niche – frequently between 84-86 MPH, tickling 90 MPH every once in a while. As David said, his slider is the key to his success, and from what I’ve seen, he commands it better than his fastball.

Snyder has not been afraid to attack right-handed batters with back-foot sliders. When he sequences it well, it is a fantastic complement to his developing change-up.

Snyder’s stuff nearly earned him a LOOGY role this season, and with a little more polish, it won’t be hard to imagine him earning a bigger role than that. With improved command of his change-up, Snyder projects comfortably into a middle- to short-relief role.

Monday
Jun282010

The Story That Will Never End

There's little rivaling the feeling of exhilaration that stems from your favorite team not just winning, but winning often -- and yet, writing about a team that has done so many things right over the last four weeks has proven more challenging than I presumed it would be. I don't know. Maybe it's because I personally find it more difficult to write from an interesting angle when there are relatively few sources of aggravation/controversy in the Rangers' midst; case in point, virtually every position on the major league roster -- with the possible exception of the starting rotation -- that was troublesome 1-2 months ago has stabilized. Catcher. First base. Third base. Center field. You name it.

And so it is that I find myself leaning on Maury Brown's latest early-morning update on the most tumultuous business-side story to ever encompass the Rangers, that being the word that the ballclub has reportedly filed an amended version of the "pre-packaged [bankruptcy] plan" that, ostensibly at least, "seems" to meet the conditions necessary to lift impairments -- or the absence of due rights -- of the Rangers' first- and second-class creditors and, by virtue of that, would eliminate their ability to block the sale of the team via vote.

How significant is this? As far as I understand it (and despite the thousands of words I've dispensed on this subject over the last year, my understanding at this stage is not especially advanced), it's significant, but also an action that was expected, and not one that begets any ironclad assurances that the sale will get finished on the timetable necessary to enable pre-July 31st big-ticket acquisitions. Concurrently, however (and provided that the plan does now meet Judge Lynn's standards of comfirmability), I'm not certain what recourse the creditors will have left beyond being able to pursue litigation after the fact against the company which currently owns the Rangers -- that is, Texas Rangers Baseball Partners -- and Hicks Sports Group.

If, however, there is still some sort of hitch in the bankruptcy plan that precludes Judge Lynn's approval, it will probably be time to begin reading into the underlying meaning of this inadvertent remark from one Commissioner's Office attorney: "If [Lynn] doesn’t confirm the plan we’ll just terminate the franchise. We'll take over the g--damn franchise." The implication here appears to be that Bud Selig would finally invoke the "best interests of the game" clause if the Rangers were dealt one more massive setback, but there are two items of intrigue here, those being (a) the evolution of said clause and (b) the ramifications for the rest of American professional sports.

One of the things that seems to get lost whenever the best interests clause is mentioned is that the clause was seemingly never intended to be employed where financial matters are concerned; in 1994, Selig wrote that the powers linked to the clause were "inherently narrow" and stated that "the notion of an almighty commissioner directing the business of baseball is incorrect." Selig's predecessor, Fay Vincent, affirmed that the clause was never intended to be used against lenders. And, of course, even if baseball were to take that ultimate step and seize the franchise, another legal showdown would assuredly ensue between Major League Baseball and the Rangers' creditors, along with the causation of what sources have described as "convulsions" in the sports finance market.

This probably isn't the morning missive you wanted to read, and it's really not the one I wanted to write, but the end game here -- whatever the heck it is -- is unarguably a bigger deal than any single regular-season game the Rangers will play this year. Appreciative as I am of the way Texas has played in recent weeks, this is still one huge fish that requires frying.

Sunday
Jun272010

Sunday Morning Open Thread: Five Questions

1. Into which camp(s) do you fall vis-a-vis the Rangers right now: the optimistic camp (now that Texas has won 11 out of 12 games), the pessimistic camp (brutal second-half schedule) or somewhere in between?

2. Was Friday night's somewhat controversial bout yet another example of the umpiring trying to overshadow the rest of the game? Phrased more informally, are you as beaten down by the state of major league umpiring as the majority seems to be?

3. Do you harbor much optimism at this point that the sale of the Rangers will be completed before July 31st, much less before hot commodities such as Cliff Lee -- whom FOXSports.com's Ken Rosenthal suggests could be dealt in the next two weeks -- disappear from the market?

4. And speaking of Lee, a hypothetical trade proposal sans Martin Perez, who nobody seems to want to trade: Seattle is willing to take Tanner Scheppers plus Blake Beavan, but doesn't subsidize any salary, thus precluding any further trades this summer. The trade is completed on July 15th. Do you pull the trigger?

5. Using your eyes alone, what would you deem to be the three best pitches thrown by any current member(s) of the Rangers' pitching staff? (For example, Neftali Feliz's fastball, Tommy Hunter's curveball, etc.)

Friday
Jun252010

Secret Sauce And The Rangers

Eleven? Yeah, eleven. These are, by and large, opposing teams with true-talent winning percentages somewhere in the .400-.450 range that the Rangers are lining up and picking off with deadly efficiency, but they're still major league teams -- teams that have given Texas periodic fits over the years. I guess what I'm saying is, don't take eleven for granted, because the odds lean towards some number of years elapsing before we see a run like this again.

With the already-growing-old refrain of "eleven" ringing around in our heads, naturally our eyes persist in wandering down the road and towards the division crown and beyond (and, of course, towards the trade market, which seems to be a point of discussion at a remarkably early date this year), but some aren't quite sold on the "beyond" part. One of the ideas that has proliferated over the last month or two is that Texas, by virtue of ostensibly not matching up well with Boston or New York or Tampa Bay in a short playoff series (and thus, in the eyes of some, not being a legitimate World Series-contending ballclub yet), should stand pat and reserve the trade ammo for a later date.

Of course, windows of contention do not remain wide open -- or even slightly ajar -- indefinitely, nor do things always work out the way you envision; a few high-profile prospect busts and some major league regression here and there and you can conceivably find yourself cast back into .500-level territory rather quickly. One of the simpler counterarguments would boil down to "take your shot now, because you don't know if/when you'll get another shot." But for the sake of further discussion, let's take this first argument at face value and ask the operative question(s): "As presently constituted, can the Rangers contend for a World Series? If not, what do they need to do to get there?"

Long-time readers of Baseball Time in Arlington will no doubt recall what I'm about to reference, but many others won't, so let me familiarize those who aren't up to speed on the "secret sauce" concept. Four years ago, former Baseball Prospectus managing partner Nate Silver went about determining -- and articulating -- which specific characteristics of playoff teams correlate with post-season success, and found only three such characteristics: (a) a power pitching staff, as measured by normalized strikeout rate, (b) a good closer, as measured by WXRL (BP's version of relief wins above replacement), and (c) a good defense, which can be somewhat reliably be measured in this day and age with one of the now-freely available play-by-play-based defensive metrics.

As Silver stated: "Of the dozens of team characteristics that we tested for statistical significance, in terms of their relationship with winning post-season games and series, these were the only three that mattered." Not surprisingly, all three are somehow interwoven with run prevention, which assumes heightened importance in a post-season context. And, interestingly enough, the Rangers have posted a top-five "secret sauce" score in all of baseball, which would seem to contradict the notion that the Rangers are not equipped to compete in the post-season:

[Teams No. 1 and 2 were the Giants (8) and Padres (10), respectively. I ditched BP's fielding runs above average (FRAA) metric for a hybrid of Ultimate Zone Rating (UZR) and the plus/minus (+/-) defensive rating systems, which I felt better reflected team defensive talent levels. 'Score' is simply the summation of all three rankings, a method employed by BP on its own "secret sauce" page.]

Considering the current plight of the Rangers' back-end rotation options (neither Rich Harden nor Derek Holland will be available until after the All-Star break, and the only thing the former has going for him is that he wields higher upside than similarly undesirable starters Matt Harrison and Dustin Nippert), you'd have a difficult time protesting the idea that Roy Oswalt or Cliff Lee would help propel Texas closer to the top; granted, neither is really a traditional power strikeout pitcher, but they're both posting their highest strikeout -- and swinging strikeout -- rates since the mid-00s, and would both represent upgrades over the status quo in that regard.

We can argue about the merits and flaws of differently composed hypothetical prospect packages for the Lee/Oswalt tandem all day long and end up right back where we started; some would call that one of the more annoying aspects of the trade deadline, but I find it all rather entertaining in its own way. What I'm not sure can be so easily argued is that the Rangers are assured of a one-and-done appearance, provided they persevere into October. Between that strong "secret sauce" ranking and the reality that anything -- I repeat for emphasis, anything -- can happen in a five- or seven-game series, such a defeatist position may be even more untenable than you would assume at first glance.

Thursday
Jun242010

The Curious Case Of Christopher Davis

Once upon a time, Chris Davis was one of the most highly regarded position prospects in baseball. In his first full professional season in 2007, Davis hit 36 home runs and batted .297/.347/.598 as a 21-year-old in the California and Texas Leagues. Baseball America ranked him No. 65 on its annual top 100 prospects list. Davis was even better as a 22-year-old, as he hit .335/.376/.618 in 202 plate appearances in AA, .333/.402/.685 in 127 plate appearances in AAA, and .285/.331/.549 in 317 plate appearances in the major leagues. Had he been eligible, Davis would have ranked among the top 20 prospects in baseball at the end of 2008.

And then came the first three months of the 2009 season. The Rangers' starting first baseman struck out in 41.2 percent of his plate appearances en route to a .202/.256/.415 slash line. Davis was sent to AAA where he reduced his strikeout rate to 23.6 percent, increased his walk rate to 12.8 percent, and hit .327/.418/.521. Davis returned to Arlington for the last two months of 2009 and hit a much more respectable .308/.338/.496, while striking out in 25.4 percent of his plate appearances. Davis’ reduced strikeout rate did come with a cost, as his extra-base hit rate dropped to 29 percent from the 49 percent that he had posted during his minor and major league career up to that point.

Davis got off to a slow start again in 2010, hitting .188/.282/.294 in 53 major league at-bats before he was demoted to the minors. In 213 plate appearances for the Triple-A Oklahoma City Redhawks, Davis has hit .352/.406/.539, and struck out in just 21.7 percent of his at-bats after striking out in 35.4 percent of his major league at-bats at the beginning of 2010. 

The root cause of Davis’ problems in 2009 and 2010 is easy to identify: Through his first three professional seasons, Davis posted nearly identical numbers against left- and right-handed pitchers (.300/.352/.603 and .303/.353/.558 vs. minor league right- and left-handed pitchers, respectively, and .288/.336/.534 and .286/.330/.607 vs. major league right- and left-handed pitchers, respectively). In 2009, Davis continued to hit right-handers well, but he suddenly lost his way against lefties (see graph below). It started with a 44 percent strikeout rate and a .141/.203/.282 line vs. major league left-handers at the beginning of the 2009 season.

Although he had decimated left-handed pitchers in AAA the year before (.310/.382/.724), Davis "struggled" against Triple-A left-handers after his demotion, hitting .283/.316/.491 in 53 plate appearances while hitting .351/.463/.581 in 111 plate appearances against right-handers. Until a few days ago, the trend had continued in 2010 as Davis had dominated right-handed pitchers in AAA (.363/.413/.575) and struggled against left-handers (.267/.367/.267). In the past week, Davis has two singles, two doubles, and a HBP to raise his season line against lefties to .306/.381/.389. That is beginning to approach respectable, but a far cry from what he is doing against right-handers.

The strange thing about the sudden change in Davis’ performance is that there was not a readily apparent alteration in how major league left-handers approached pitching to him. As noted in the first table below, Davis has seen roughly the same distribution of pitches from left-handers in each of his major league stints. Davis’ lack of performance against left-handers in early 2009 derived almost exclusively from an inability to hit fastballs, as the rate that he put balls in play dropped from 17 percent in 2008 to five percent in the first half of 2009. He improved his in-play rate on fastballs from major league left-handers to 13 percent in the second half of 2009 and to 16 percent in early 2010; thus, this does not appear to be a recurring problem. With that said, his overall struggles with left-handers appear unlikely to go away soon.

LHP Pitch Usage vs. Chris Davis (Major Leagues, 2008-2010) 

Chris Davis Going Forward

Prior to each season, Baseball Prospectus publishes a list of players whose age-appropriate statistical profiles are most similar to each player in the league. Earlier this year, the 15 players with statistical profiles through their age-23 seasons that were most similar to Chris Davis comprised eight players who became everyday contributors in the major leagues and included Eric Karros (No. 1), Glenn Davis (No. 4), Joey Votto (No. 6), Lee Stevens (No. 9), Richie Sexson (No. 12), and David Ortiz (No. 14).

According to the Minor League Equivalency Calculator, Davis’ .361/.414/.564 in 202 Triple-A at-bats would be equivalent to a major league line of .305/.354/.459. That’s Adam LaRoche/Gaby Sanchez-level production. Davis’ .368/.418/.583 in 163 Triple-A at-bats against right-handed pitchers translates to a major league line of .312/.358/.482, while his .306/.381/.389 against left-handers would be equivalent to .259/.302/.326 in the majors. Davis is Ryan Howard when facing right-handers and a Triple-A journeyman when facing left-handers.

Davis’ hitting against left-handers seems likely to improve as he gains experience against quality southpaws. Most power hitters improve their slugging and walk rates through their age-27 or -28 seasons. Given that he is still just 24 years old and that he advanced quickly through the minor leagues, it is very likely that Davis will improve significantly in the next few seasons. 

If the Rangers resist the temptation to trade Davis, the challenge will be in finding a role for him. In the near-term, he appears ideally suited as the left-handed component of a 1B/DH platoon. Unfortunately for Davis, the major league team doesn’t currently have that need. Although the sample sizes and metric quality are too limited to be sure, it appears that Davis is making progress with his defense at third base (see table below). Assuming that is the case, then it is possible that Davis could provide Young, Smoak, and Guerrero with an occasional day off and pinch hit for a catcher when the situation calls for a left-handed hitter. That’s not the most valuable thing in the world, but it appears to be role that Davis can fill.  For now, Davis provides excellent insurance for injuries that affect 1B, 3B, or DH.

By 2011, Davis could be a part of the solution at DH or 1B if Vlad departs as a free agent. By 2012, Davis could potentially platoon with or perhaps even replace Michael Young as the team’s third baseman. If he spends another month in the minors, then Davis will be under club control through the 2015 season, when he will be 29 years old. Davis is unlikely to be the perennial All-Star that many hoped for following his 2008 season, but it appears very likely that he will eventually develop into a player who could be a key contributor to a contending team. And for now, he is the most interesting position player in the Rangers’ minor league system.

Wednesday
Jun232010

Bankrupt: On The Media's Fiduciary Duty To Rangers Fans

Michael Young indicates his confusion over the Rangers' on-going bankruptcy proceedings.Yesterday afternoon, Daniel Kaplan of the Sports Business Journal scooped everyone by posting breaking news about the Rangers' bankruptcy proceedings on Twitter.  "Federal judge finds Texas Rangers impaired," he wrote, "likely means they can block the sale." 

This wasn't quite right. Judge D. Michael Lynn, who's presiding over the Rangers' Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, did not find the ballclub impaired. (Nearly four decades of Rangers fans might've agreed with him if he had, but that's beside the point.) And the Rangers were not going to block their own sale. Rather, the judge found the club's creditors impaired, along with its equity owners.

(At the prompting of a contributor at Lone Star Ball, Kaplan later corrected his "tweet"; the original is no longer online.) 

Kaplan quickly moved on. "Said source close to creditors: 'This is great news. [...] Means plan is not confirmable,'" he reported. He made no other further information available. For an hour or two, there was no further indication from Kaplan regarding the context for his coverage. There was no explanation of the grounds for the judge's decision, or detail about Kaplan's source(s), or why he granted one source close to the creditors anonymity. 

Meanwhile, Judge Lynn's memo was uploaded to the website Scrib'd, where anyone could peruse it. Within an hour or so of Kaplan's initial posting, "Unfair Park" -- the blog of the Dallas Observer -- had posted a link to the document, accompanied by an entry quoting Kaplan's messages, and the claim, "It would appear to be a good day for the creditors." 

Soon thereafter, however, the Observer updated its story, adding the following: 

A good Friend of Unfair Park, who happens to be a local bankruptcy attorney, summarizes thusly for those of us who were not smart enough to go to law school: 

"If the creditors are happy, it's because Lynn didn't just completely pour them out. He is not going to confirm the plan as it now stands, but all Hicks has to do is amend the plan to pay the creditors interest on their 75MM. 
 
Once the new plan goes on file, the two Rangers equity companies have to re-vote to approve it. In order to scuttle the deal now, the creditors have to figure out a way to take control of the Rangers equity companies so they can cast the vote the way they want. The involuntary bankruptcy cases that the creditors filed against the Rangers equity companies may eventually get the creditors some control, but not soon enough I'll bet. Later, I think Kapla
n et al. will realize the creditors (Monarch) just won the battle and lost the war." 

At the same time, Kaplan was engaged in an argument with another, legally trained reader from LSB, who -- having read the memo -- found it less of a victory for the Rangers' creditors than Kaplan's reporting implied. In response to the reader's observation that the judge's memo seemed to indicate that minor changes might resolve the situation, Kaplan replied, "Minor? Oh come on. The judge ruled the plan can't proceed without lender approval. End of story."

But, of course, it wasn't the end of the story. And with due respect to the good friend of "Unfair Park," the required modifications to the plan were not obviously limited to adding interest to $75 million dollars. 

And the reports kept coming, fast and furious.  

Buster Olney, about an hour after Kaplan's tweet: "The judge's decision today on the Rangers' creditors is viewed by execs in baseball as a big blow to the team's efforts to trade pre-Aug. 1." No word on which execs; no word on whether or how Olney had managed to poll a representative sample of informed decision-makers within an hour or so of Kaplan's tweet, and before most people had a chance to digest the judge's memo. 

Craig Calcaterra, at about the same time: "Big loss for the Rangers in b[ank]r[u]ptcy court today. Decision could end any hopes of a move before the deadline." In his accompanying blog entry, he stated, "[The judge's ruling] means [the lenders] can vote to accept or reject the prepackaged plan that the team had come up with. Of course, the creditors have said they would reject the prepackaged plan, so unless something dramatic happens soon, they probably will." He made this assertion despite the fact that, as he admitted, he hadn't read the judge's memo in its entirety. 

In lieu of that, Calcaterra referred readers to Maury Brown's website, and concluded, "That sound you hear is every Rangers fan in the world screaming bloody murder to the heavens above. Once they get done venting, however, they should refocus those screams at Tom Hicks because he's the one that got everything in such a mess to begin with." 

What did Maury Brown's website have to say at the time? The headline read, "Judge's Ruling in Texas Rangers Bankruptcy Case Could Pave Way for Lenders to Block Sale"; the report opened, "The bankruptcy judge in the voluntary bankruptcy case of the Texas Rangers may have dealt a blow to the prospective ownership group led by Chuck Greenberg and Nolan Ryan." Brown's piece cited Kaplan's earlier "tweet." Separately, he tweeted agreeably at Kaplan, "Yeah, this is no small deal. Mediation seems like best route for both sides. Plan would have to be amended greatly, otherwise." 

Kaplan, for his part, posted his own story on the Sports Business Daily website (with no paywall); its headline was, "Judge rules Rangers' creditors have right to block sale of team." In this report, however, he also noted, "Lynn did not order the Rangers to pursue the Crane bid, and in fact ruled the club was not bound to take the highest offer." This was an aspect of the memo that had not received much attention on the afternoon, though it had been a central focus of coverage leading up to the judge's ruling. 

Kaplan and Brown proceeded to give on-air interviews with Dallas-Fort Worth radio shows (the former with "The Hardline"; the latter with Randy Galloway) to explain their expert opinions on the day's events.  

Meanwhile, the churn continued -- but with a twist. One or two hours after Kaplan's initial tweet, Evan Grant posted his first comments at the Dallas Morning News -- and struck a cautionary note. "First," he wrote, "Rangers business-side officials did not comment on judge's opinion today, so most of this is speculation of the purest nature." Similarly, the Fort Worth Star-Telegram's Barry Schlachter observed, "The decisions represented a partial victory for the lenders… [but] just how big the setback is remains to be seen." 

Just more than an hour later, Grant returned with a copy of Eric Morath's coverage of the memo for Dow Jones. The headline: "Ruling does not give lenders ability to veto sale." Morath's reporting is also worth citing at length: 

A U.S. bankruptcy judge said Tuesday that the Texas Rangers baseball team's Chapter 11 plan doesn't make lenders to the club's owners whole, but that doesn't give the lenders the right to block a sale of the franchise…. 

The judge said the plan must be modified to grant [the lenders] the same rights against the bankrupt entity, Texas Rangers Baseball Partners, once it emerges from Chapter 11, as the lenders had before that entity filed. But since that entity likely will have sold its most valuable asset -- the Major League Baseball team -- the lenders' "rights may have lost much of their usefulness"... 

[Lynn] said the lenders could pursue possible damage claims against the bankrupt entity and Hicks Sports Group following confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan. If the changes Lynn suggested are incorporated into the team's bankruptcy-exit plan, "the plan will be confirmable," the judge said in court papers. 

Later, Maury Brown weighed in again, but with a considerably different tone. "Upon Further Review, Texas Rangers Bankruptcy 'Plan' Could Move Forward Shortly," his headline read. Brown's intro: "After further inspection, press reports regarding a U.S. Bankruptcy judge's ruling saying creditors had veto power over a 'prepackaged plan' that would exit the Texas Rangers from voluntary bankruptcy may not be as detrimental as initially believed." 

For his part, Kaplan refocused on the appointment of William Snyder as Chief Restructuring Officer. He began by noting, "Other huge development of the day with [Texas R]angers: judge appointed a chief reconstruction officer to also vote on the sale: more in S[ports] B[usiness] D[aily] tom[orrow]." He later admonished Brown that the latter's latest entry reflected "the team spin, but for now [the sale is] blocked. And the real power has been shifted to this chief reconstruction officer." 

In another post, Kaplan asked his persistent LSB interrogator, "What are you, a team plant?" and reiterated, "Believe what you want. Right now the sale is blocked and the CRO has a lot of power." But not long thereafter, he opined, "[The] judge will really try to resolve this…. But this may partly fall on the new CRO and his opinion" (emphasis added). And Brown came back with his own rebuttal: "But, there's ample text in the ruling that allows Debtors to reach certain criteria that blocks vote. Going to be tough."

So what are we to make of all of this? From a facts-about-the-sale perspective, I'm not going to venture an opinion. I'm not a lawyer. I don't play one on TV. I didn't even stay at a Holiday Inn Express last night. I have zero -- zero -- legal training. I've read Judge Lynn's memo a couple times now, and spent a fair amount of time talking about it with folks who seem to be knowledgeable, but I'm absolutely not in any position to make any definitive claims about the legal situation of the Rangers at this point. 

(Before you read any further: reread that last paragraph.) 

I don't think you have to be a lawyer, though, to follow the media chronology set out above -- and, in doing so, to realize something's not right. So I do have one strong opinion about today's events: the media coverage, especially of Judge Lynn's memo, left a lot to be desired. 

I don't mean to paint the media with too broad a brush. I appreciate those reporters (mainly but not exclusively local) who, like Grant, cautioned readers that their analyses were speculative, and who emphasized that the ramifications of Judge Lynn's memo had yet to be properly contextualized. And I am equally thankful for those few journalists who, like Morath, not only appeared to have read the judge's memo thoroughly, but also included key passages of it in their reports, with enough context and depth for readers to start making sense of the ruling. 

Unfortunately, those responsible takes were swamped by the coverage of those who, in their rush to get the story out first and fastest, made very questionable decisions. These were professionals -- people who make their living doing this sort of thing. And from them we saw reports that got basic facts wrong. We saw dependence on anonymous sources, with no stated rhyme or reason. We saw questionable assertions backed by little if any evidence. We saw reportage that more or less reversed course in the span of five hours.  

And none of this happened because there were unexpected events that surfaced over the course of the afternoon. The news of the day was the judge's memo, and that was anticipated to be the case. The memo contained almost all of the new facts that (as I write this) have been reported and analyzed. That memo raised a number of obvious questions (both to my untrained eyes, and to a number of more trained pairs). But most of those who were quickest to report the story punted those questions for several hours -- even as they were publicly weighing in on the purportedly dire consequences of the judge's ruling for the Rangers. 

Blurring breaking news with preliminary and tentative analyses is bad enough. Compounding the confusion by going live with incomplete information is worse. Adding ad hominem replies to readers to that mixture is toxic.  

Look: I'm no Luddite. I'm (obviously, I hope) a fan of blogs. I think they have an important role to play in the media. I believe that even Twitter has its place in conveying key information. But the professionals who provide us with news have to do a better job of reporting in situations like these. 

One reader here suggested that rather than post a piece like this, I should contact some of the reporters involved, and engage them in private, constructive, critical dialogues. That's a good suggestion, and I'm open to it. But after reading some of the responses to those who've already posed critical questions and perspectives, it doesn't seem sufficient. 

The sale of the Texas Rangers is, on the grand scale of world events, a very minor issue – but that doesn't excuse journalists from reporting on it in a responsible, thorough, and professional manner. And if some don't, readers have no excuse for sitting by and letting it happen. 

In short: the sound we should hear is "every Rangers fan in the world screaming bloody murder to the heavens above" – but for one day, at least, it's not just about Tom Hicks.

Tuesday
Jun222010

The Unloved, Revisited: The Continuing Saga Of Ian Kinsler 

It’s been about a month.

One month – give or take a day or two – since we took a long, hard look at Ian Kinsler. In that time, according to Baseball Reference, Kinsler’s played 27 games. He’s had 122 plate appearances, and 105 at-bats. What’s the damage?

.248/.331/.286.

26 hits. No homers. Four doubles. 11 walks. 17 strikeouts.  3 times hit by a pitch. 4 stolen bases (with no failures on attempts). A couple sacrifice flies; a questionable sac bunt. One GIDP. A ton of frustration. And one serious question:

What’s wrong with Ian Kinsler?

There are a lot of possible answers. Some of them were supplied in response to the last question we raised about him – namely: Why isn't Ian Kinsler getting anything resembling the same sort of love as, say, Elvis Andrus? Kinsler’s attitude was cited repeatedly, with examples ranging from his power-happy approach in the leadoff spot to his fan-unfriendly comments in the local press.

What was interesting to me, however, was that most readers were largely complimentary of Ian. They defended him. They were loyal. They expressed hope that he’d keep up his strong return from the DL by reestablishing his power at the plate, without sacrificing his improved plate discipline and recharged ability to get on base. And many of them agreed with the prediction that, “as for Kinsler's missing power: hard to believe that -- as he himself anticipated -- the dingers won't come with time.”

But they haven’t. A month later, Kinsler’s still just got one home run. He’s sporting a home run to fly ball (HR/FB) percentage of 1.7 – meaning that fewer than 1 out of every 50 fly balls he hits is leaving the park. (His season low was 8.8 percent, from his rookie year.)

And that’s far and away the best answer to the question of what’s wrong with Ian Kinsler: missing power. Even during the past 10 games, during which Kinsler put up a healthy .333 batting average and an even healthier .413 on-base percentage, his power has been conspicuously absent. He racked up only two extra-base hits – both doubles – in that 39-AB stretch, and as a result, his slugging percentage over the period was .385 (which is still 30 points higher than his mark for the season).

Really: if someone had told you before this season that after 205 PA in 2010, Ian Kinsler would boast a .273 BA and a .377 OBP, wouldn’t you have just mentally filled in the last third of the slash line with a figure between .450 and .480, and been pretty damn pleased?

Instead: .349, and a .076 isolated power metric (ISO). The league averages for those stats are .405 and .147, respectively. Players with an ISO above .076 this season (with at least as many PA as Kinsler): David Eckstein, Jerry Hairston, Jr., Ronny Cedeno, and Julio Borbon.

That’s right: Julio Borbon.

And this one’s for the fans who locked their faith inside.

So what’s the scenario? It’s a good news, bad news situation.

The good news is not just that Kinsler seems to be aware of his lack of power. (How could he not be?) It’s that he also seems to be trying to adjust to it. He may not be happy about it. (The numerous grimaces and bat flips indicate as much). But despite the lingering claims from some parties that Kinsler’s “pulling a Blalock,” Kinsler hasn’t been swinging out of his shoes during every plate appearance the past month. He hasn’t been hacking away at every pitch. He’s swinging at only slightly more pitches out of the zone as he ever has, and is  five percent under league average in that category; he’s also offering at many fewer pitches in the zone, though making contact with them more frequently.

He hasn’t even been popping up as often as some might have you think. In fact, according to the TexasLeaguers Pitchf/x database, Kinsler popped out (very slightly) less frequently in the last month than he did from April 30 through May 19. And according to FanGraphs, he hasn’t had an infield pop fly in June. His post-Memorial Day ground ball/fly ball ratio is right around even, as it was throughout May.

And Kinsler’s still using the whole field. Recall his comment to the Star-Telegram’s Jeff Wilson a month or so ago: “I'm staying away from hitting the ball in the air. I'm hitting it the other way, hitting it on a line. It just makes me a better hitter. Eventually, home runs will come, but right now I'm really happy with where I'm at offensively. I'm going up there trying to hit the ball the other way, trying to be a better hitter this year.”

Let’s reevaluate that self-assessment. Here’s Kinsler’s spray chart for the past month:

And, as in the last piece, during his first 19 games: 

Kinsler’s pulling the vast majority of his infield outs, but his hits are, indeed, scattered to all fields. Very few of them, however, are deep. It’s not just the home runs; he’s posting a career low fly ball percentage thus far, and his line on such balls is .182/.175/.291, per Baseball Reference.

And that starts us in on the bad news. In his early action, Kinsler was somewhat compensating for his lack of high-trajectory power by (as he claimed) hitting a high number of balls hard, low, and all over the field. And when he has hit line drives, Kinsler’s continued to be extraordinary (.815/.815/1.037 for the season). He’s just not hitting the ball on a line often enough. In June, he’s only posting about 14.5 percent line drives – down 3.5 percent from May, and more than five percent off his career average.

In addition to the plethora of weak fly balls, Kinsler’s simply hitting many, many more balls (40.4 percent, to be precise) on the ground than he ever has before. A lot of those ground balls are ending up as outs (a .263/.263/.281 line), and his .324 BABIP (and .306 expected BABIP, based on Chris Dutton’s quick calculator) indicates that overall, he’s been a bit fortunate in his batted-ball outcomes.

The most likely explanation for all of this would appear to be injury. It’s very plausible that Kinsler’s balky ankle is preventing him from hitting the ball with any consistent authority. Trouble is, he’s stated definitively that his ankle won’t be 100 percent this season – and considering the wear and tear that he’ll accumulate through the next 90-odd games (assuming he stays “healthy” throughout), it seems quite likely that Kinsler will finish with the worst slugging numbers of his five-year career.

On a sardonic note, Kinsler’s approach has, in some ways, been exactly what many fans were howling for last season – he’s being more patient at the plate, hitting fewer balls in the air, and has sacrificed power so as to reach base more frequently.

But even with tongue squarely in cheek, it’s worrisome that in the past month, Kinsler’s stopped walking at his early, prodigious pace. Just 9 percent of his PA in the last 27 games have ended in a base on balls, compared to the 15.7 percent from his first 19 games of the season. (His strikeout percentage decreased much less markedly, from approximately 17 to 13 percent.)

The walks are going to be a key statistic to watch if Kinsler’s power outage continues. Right now, his .377 OBP and his glove are his saving graces; without a steady stream of free passes, however, Kinsler’s offensive productivity could drop to a dire level. Even in the midst of his recent 10-game tear, Kinsler walked just over 9 percent of the time (and 3 of his 4 bases on balls came in one game against the Astros). Over the same period, he struck out in 16 percent of his PA.

(It’s also worth noting that Kinsler’s displaying the massive platoon and home/road splits that he avoided in 2008 – though given the small sample sizes, it’s probably too early to say much more than “keep an eye on them.”)

Ian Kinsler’s too talented a ballplayer to write off, even if he’s not 100 percent. And for all his vaunted stubbornness, there are encouraging signs that he’s trying to find ways to fight through his pain and misery in relatively productive fashion. But at some point, if Kinsler’s offensive woes continue – and if his ankle is truly a major culprit – then the Rangers are going to have to weigh the merits of a return trip to the DL. It may well be more effective to feature a stronger, healthier, more-rested Kinsler during the stretch run than to push him to play every day up through the All-Star break.

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