Will Elvis Andrus (pictured) prove capable of compensating for his inadequate bat in 2009?One of several misconceptions I have noticed swirling around the baseball blogosphere since the Texas Rangers opted to publicly throw their support behind 20-year-old Elvis Andrus last week has been the notion that because the left side of the projected 2009 infield appears substantially stronger on paper from a defensive standpoint, that thus constitutes a major projected improvement over the voluminous assortment of players the Rangers fielded at shortstop and third base in 2008 in terms of total value.

That, unfortunately, really isn't the case.

Given that I have been among the most vocal of those incessantly prattling on about just how egregiously shabby the Rangers' defensive body of work was at the hot corner in 2008, I suppose I am partly to blame for this statistical misinterpretation. While it is ostensibly true that the motley crew of infielders in question that were utilized by the Rangers at third base -- including Hank Blalock, Chris Davis, German Duran, Travis Metcalf and the now-departed Ramon Vazquez -- cost Texas anywhere from 25 to 30 runs defensively beyond that of what a league-average third baseman would have yielded, and while it is also true that Texas is now far better positioned in that regard going forward, the enormous projected gain in runs saved is going to be largely neutralized by the runs lost offensively.

In a somewhat inspired attempt to illustrate this concept, I've approximated some offensive and defensive numbers in the table you see below using the previously discussed concept of wins above replacement (level). For 2008, I've taken the overall batting lines Texas extracted out of shortstop (.283/.339/.408 in 767 PA) and third base (.281/.339/.469 in 655 PA) and roughly converted them into wOBA, or weighted on-base average, using the method suggested by Beyond the Box Score's Sky Kalkman; for 2009, I loosely employed Sean Smith's CHONE offensive projections for Michael Young (.284/.351/.423) and Elvis Andrus (.238/.286/.312), again roughly converted them into wOBA, and then extrapolated them out over 700 plate appearances, which is a nice, convenient number to work with -- albeit one with a major limitation, which I'll briefly touch on later.

From there, it was a cinch to compute offensive run values above and below average, which are denoted by the 'BAT' column; however, before we go any further, perhaps a two-paragraph primer on wOBA would be in order:

OPS, as you probably know, significantly undervalues the ability of a hitter to get on base. It treats a .330 OBP/.470 slug as equal to a .400 OBP/.400 slug, when the latter is more conducive to scoring runs. wOBA gives proper weight to all the things a hitter can do to produce value, and is a more accurate reflection of a hitter’s value.

[...] The other great advantage wOBA has is that it’s extremely easy to convert into run values. Simply take a player’s wOBA difference from the league average, divide by 1.15, and multiply that by how many plate appearances he got, and you have a run value above or below average for that player.

'FLD' denotes the number of defensive runs above or below average at the position in question, which can be roughly calculated -- for 2008, at least -- with John Dewan's plus/minus defensive rating system and Mitchel Lichtman's Ultimate Zone Rating. As one might surmise, educated guesses came into play with the 2009 defensive projections, but can be altered at your own discretion; if, for example, you believe that Andrus and his presumptive backup/mentor, Omar Vizquel, will contribute more than five runs above average defensively in 2009, you can add to the number I assigned. Remember, this little exercise is almost entirely reliant on ballpark figures.

'ADJ[usted]' is the summation of the replacement level adjustment (set at 20 runs per 600 plate appearances and allocated as necessary) and Tom Tango's positional adjustments, both of which are explained in greater detail here. 'BAT,' 'FLD' and 'ADJ' collectively comprise 'V[alue]. Runs,' or runs above replacement, which results in 'V[alue]. Wins' when divided by 10.

Now that your mind has been properly blown, we can dive into the actual numbers:

Note that I have actually been quite generous with regard to Andrus's projected offensive output; his actual CHONE-projected wOBA is .270, but if you're daring enough to believe that he can notch a .300 on-base percentage and .315 slugging percentage (and that Vizquel can match that level of offensive "prowess" if Andrus should falter entirely), then .280 is an appropriate number.

This, my friends, is what you're probably going to get -- and, for that matter, what you should be bracing yourselves for -- from a 20-year-old shortstop who hasn't played a day above AA-ball, talented and charismatic and poised as he might be. This is what might well equate to a step backwards in terms of value runs produced by the left side of the infield in 2009 when compared to 2008, and this is what I was attempting to delineate.

Now, is any of that to say that the renewed emphasis the organization has placed on good fielding -- particularly from the infield, where strong defense is doubly important if you want to build an effective ground ball-inducing pitching staff -- is misguided? Not in the slightest. In fact, I daresay this is one of the more encouraging and uplifting organizational developments of the off-season from a baseball philosophy standpoint. Good fielding begets improved run prevention, which in turn begets winning more ballgames.

And, of course, my little chart is inherently flawed; given that Young more likely than not will take the field 98 percent of the time in the three-hole this coming season, he's going to end up logging more than 700 plate appearances; conversely; Andrus and Vizquel -- or whoever is summoned to play shortstop -- won't log 700 plate appearances batting eighth or ninth, and that throws off the offensive numbers to a certain degree. Andrus's blinding speed isn't accounted for here, and it's quite possible that he'll generate runs on the basepaths with a high enough stolen-base percentage, or that he'll outpace his offensive projection, or that Young will underperform ... projections are, well, projections, and should always be viewed in that context.

Hopefully, the immediate ramifications of the tradeoff the Rangers have chosen to make for the 2009 season (that is, sacrificing offense for defense) have come into slightly clearer focus. I fully comprehend that the decision to move Young now and make the starting shortstop job Andrus's to lose was predicated on preparing for legitimate playoff contention in 2010 and beyond; that said, it's going to take a little while for the benefits to actually materialize.